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DISAGREEING WITH THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD THAT DAMAGES FOR “PRE-IMPACT TERROR” ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN A MED MAL CASE; HERE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK IN 2008 AND DIED IN 2011 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in the med mal case, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Maltese, determined the damages for “pre-impact terror” were not appropriate. Plaintiff suffered a heart attack in 2008 and died in 2011:

… [P]re-impact terror delineated as emotional pain and suffering as a separate item of damages is inappropriate in this medical malpractice and wrongful death action and would represent an inappropriate extension of the law with respect to this issue. Traditionally, damages for pre-impact terror have been awarded in cases involving motor vehicle accidents and other types of accidents … . Here, where the “impact” was the decedent’s heart attack, the damages for emotional pain and suffering cannot accurately be characterized as damages for pre-impact terror, because they were intended to compensate for the fear the decedent experienced after the heart attack occurred in January 2008 at Westchester Medical Center until his death more than three years later on October 27, 2011, at Yale-New Haven Hospital. Further, unlike a motor vehicle accident where the defendant driver causes the impact, the WMC defendants did not cause the decedent’s heart attack. To the extent that the Appellate Division, First Department, determined otherwise in Small v City of New York (213 AD3d 475), we decline to follow that decision. Molina v Goldberg, 2024 NY Slip Op 03818, Second Dept 7-17-24

Practice Point: Disagreeing with the First Department, the Second Department held damages for “pre-impact terror” are not appropriate in the med mal case.

 

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