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PLAINTIFF FELL FROM AN A-FRAME LADDER OWNED BY A CONTRACTOR, DAL, HE DID NOT WORK FOR; BASED ON DISPUTED EVIDENCE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE, DAL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WAS DENIED BY SUPREME COURT; THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, OVER A DISSENT, REVERSED, FINDING DAL DID NOT OWE PLAINTIFF A DUTY OF CARE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Oing, over a dissenting opinion, determined defendant contractor, DAL, did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff who fell from an A-frame ladder owned by DAL. Plaintiff had finished his measuring work using a ladder and scaffold which he had removed from the area. Plaintiff was then asked to confirm his measurements. He returned to the area and used an A-frame ladder that was already set up there. The ladder wobbled and he fell. It turned out the ladder was owned by DAL, with which plaintiff had no connection. There was disputed evidence the ladder was defective and DAL was alleged to have created a dangerous condition. Supreme Court found there was a question of fact supporting plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action. The majority reversed, finding DAL did not owe plaintiff a duty of care:

Because DAL was not an owner, a general contractor, or a statutory agent of an owner or general contractor, the Labor Law § 200 claim against it could not stand … . * * *

… [G]iven that DAL did not enter into a contract with plaintiff or his employer, a duty of care to plaintiff cannot arise out of a contractual relationship … . Any contractual obligations DAL may have had to its employees or to JRM, the general contractor, did not extend to plaintiff … . The question that remains is whether DAL may still owe a duty of care to plaintiff. Generally, a contracting party does not owe a duty of care to a noncontracting third party … . There are three well-settled exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties; and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely … . * * *

… [T]he record establishes that the DAL ladder was left by a DAL employee in the fifth-floor pantry at some point in the late morning on the day of accident, and that plaintiff saw the unattended ladder when he returned to the fifth-floor pantry to review his measurements from earlier that morning. Plaintiff did not know or ascertain who owned the ladder … . … [P]laintiff did not obtain permission to use the ladder, … DAL did not supply or provide plaintiff with the ladder for use to complete his tasks, … DAL had no duty to provide plaintiff with a safe or adequate ladder, and … DAL did not supervise, direct or control plaintiff’s work. … DAL did not launch a force or instrument of harm. Thus, under Espinal, DAL did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, and plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim against it cannot stand. Dibrino v Rockefeller Ctr. North, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 03558, First Dept 7-2-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff fell from an allegedly defective ladder belonging to a contractor he did not work for. Because none of the Espinal factors applied, the contractor did not owe plaintiff a duty of care. There was a dissenting opinion.​

 

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