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GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 9-103 PROVIDES IMMUNITY FROM NEGLIGENCE SUITS STEMMING FROM AUTHORIZED RECREATIONAL USE OF THE OWNER’S PROPERTY, BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE IMMUNITY FOR ACTIONS OR OMISSIONS BY THE OWNER ALLEGED TO BE “WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS” (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff mountain biker’s (Fleming’s) cause of action alleging defendants’ failure to properly maintain a wooden bridge on a trail was properly dismissed pursuant to General Obligations law section 9-103. But the cause of action alleging the negligent failure to maintain the bridge and the negligent failure to to warn of the dangerous condition, which further alleged the failure was “willful or malicious,” should not have been dismissed. Willful and malicious actions are not within the scope of the immunity provided by General Obligations Law 9-103:

Plaintiffs [allege] that defendants had constructed and maintained the bridge in a manner that created a dangerous condition, and that, by failing to maintain the bridge and failing to warn of the dangerous condition, defendants’ actions had been willful and malicious. … [T]he limitation of liability provided by General Obligations Law § 9-103 does not extend to the failure to warn of a dangerous condition if that failure was “willful or malicious” … .

… Fleming avowed that he was riding a mountain bike on trails that were publicized to be suitable for such activity by the Town of Malta. Because the first cause of action alleged only ordinary negligence, defendants were entitled to the immunity afforded by General Obligations Law § 9-103 if they could establish that Fleming was “engaged in one of the enumerated recreational activities on land suitable for that activity” … .  Fleming v Jenna’s Forest Homeowners’ Assn., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 03216, Third Dept 6-13-24

Practice Point: General Obligations Law 9-103 protects property owners from negligence suits based on the authorized recreational use of the property, but does not protect property owners from suits alleging injury from “willful or malicious” actions or omissions.

 

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