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THE COVID TOLL OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE RENDERED THE INDICTMENT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined that the COVID toll of the speedy trial statute rendered the indictment timely:

Contrary to the determination of the County Court, while it was in effect, Executive Order No. 202.87 constituted a toll of the time within which the People must be ready for trial for the period from the date a felony complaint was filed through the date of a defendant’s arraignment on the indictment, with no requirement that the People establish necessity for a toll in each particular case … .

Because Executive Order No. 202.87 served to toll the speedy trial statute, the period from December 30, 2020, to January 25, 2021, was not chargeable to the People … . People v Fuentes, 2024 NY Slip Op 02933, Second Dept 5-29-24

Practice Point: The Executive Order imposing the COVID toll of the speedy trial statute rendered the indictment in this case timely.

Same issue and result in People v Lawson, 2024 NY Slip Op 02937, Second Dept 5-29-24.

Same Issue and result in People v McPhaul, 2024 NY Slip Op 02939, Second Dept 5-29-24.

 

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