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IT WAS NOT ERROR TO REMOVE THE DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM WITHOUT WARNING JUST PRIOR THE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VERDICT AND THE POLLING OF THE JURY; APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THE “REMOVAL” ISSUE ON DIRECT APPEAL (CT APP).

The Court of appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over an extensive dissenting opinion, reversing the grant of a writ of coram nobis, determined: (1) defendant was properly removed from court without warning before the verdict and the poll of the jurors; and (2) appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise defendant’s removal from the court on direct appeal. Removal was justified by the defendant’s acts of violence, verbal abuse and screaming in the courtroom:

We reject the prosecution’s claim that any error was de minimis based on the timing of defendant’s removal from the courtroom. There is no material stage of the proceeding that is any less consequential to a defendant’s right to be present. However, we agree that the trial court’s actions were appropriate under the unique circumstances of this case and in no way contrary to law.

A defendant has a constitutional right “to be present at all material stages of their criminal trial,” which includes the reading of the verdict and the polling of the jury … . Further, CPL 260.20 provides that a defendant must be present during the trial but may be removed if they are “disorderly and disruptive” such that the “trial cannot be carried on with [the defendant] in the courtroom [] if , after [they] have been warned by the court that [they] will be removed if [they] continue such conduct, [they] continue to engage in such conduct.” A court may dispense with the constitutional and statutory warnings when it is impracticable to give them … . … That was the case here. * * *

The Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated defendant’s right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted defendant’s writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal … . People v Dunton, 2024 NY Slip Op 02130, CtApp 4-23-24

Practice Point: In situations where warning a disruptive defendant is impractical, it is not error to remove the defendant from the courtroom without warning. Here defendant was removed just prior to the announcement of the verdict and the polling of the jurors, a material stage of the trial. Under the unique circumstances of this case defendant’s removal was not error.

 

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