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HERE FAMILY COURT HAD THE INHERENT POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS THE CHILD’S FATHER; RESPONDENT WAS JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING PATERNITY BASED ON HIS POSITION IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court had the power to determine whether father (Gunderson) is responsible for the support of the child and father was judicially estopped from contesting paternity because he was awarded parental access in a prior proceeding:

… [T]he Support Magistrate, sua sponte, dismissed the mother’s petition without prejudice on the ground that the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order of child support because the parties were never married and there was no acknowledgment of parentage or order of filiation. * * *

… [B]ecause the Family Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent is responsible for the support of a child (see Family Ct Act § 413[1][a]), in appropriate cases, it also has the inherent authority to ascertain whether a respondent is a child’s parent … .

Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “a party who assumes a certain position in a prior legal proceeding and secures a favorable judgment therein is precluded from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed” … . Here, Granderson successfully obtained an order awarding him parental access with the child based on his assertion that he was a parent to the child. Matter of Joseph v Granderson, 2024 NY Slip Op 01921, Second Dept 4-10-24

Practice Point: Here, based upon Family Court’s authority to determine whether a parent is responsible for the support of the child, Family Court had the inherent authority to determine whether respondent is the child’s father.

Practice Point: Here respondent sought and was awarded parental access in a prior proceeding. He was judicially estopped from contesting paternity in this proceeding.

 

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