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DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SUFFERING FROM MENTAL ILLNESS, WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER; THE JURY’S REJECTION OF DEFENDANT’S “EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE” DEFENSE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, CONVICTION REDUCED; THE STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S MENTAL ILLNESS AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reducing defendant’s murder conviction to manslaughter first degree, over an extensive dissent, determined the jury’s determination that defendant failed to prove he was acting “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse” (Penal Law § 125.25[1][a]), was against the weight of the evidence. Defendant, who suffered from mental illness, had been involuntarily committed to to a medical facility. The victim, who was beaten and strangled, allegedly sexually assaulted defendant in the shower. The dissent argued defense counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce evidence of defendant’s mental illness in support of the motion to suppress statements defendant made to a detective:

… [W]e find that the jury’s determination that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was acting “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse” (Penal Law § 125.25[1][a]) when he killed the victim was against the weight of the evidence. The defendant’s state of mind is a subjective question, and the existence of a reasonable excuse is an objective question … . The first element, the “subjective element[,] ‘focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime and requires sufficient evidence that the defendant’s conduct was actually influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance'” … . The second element requires an objective determination as to whether there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance, and “[w]hether such a reasonable explanation or excuse exists must be determined by viewing the subjective mental condition of the defendant and the external circumstances as the defendant perceived them to be at the time, ‘however inaccurate that perception may have been'” … .

From the dissent:

At the suppression hearing, the People presented the testimony of the detective who had interviewed the defendant. The defense did not present any evidence. Defense counsel was well aware of the … voluminous psychiatric documentation concerning the defendant’s mental illness. However, defense counsel failed to move to admit into evidence any of these records. Rather, in support of the motion to suppress, defense counsel merely presented arguments that the defendant’s mental state at the time that the Miranda warnings were administered precluded the admissibility of his statements to the detective. People v Andrews, 2024 NY Slip Op 01935, Second Dept 4-10-24

Practice Point: Here, the appellate court determined the jury’s rejection of defendant’s “extreme emotional disturbance” affirmative defense was against the weight of the evidence. The murder conviction was reduced to manslaughter first degree.

 

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