You are here: / / PROMOTING PROSTITUTION CONVICTIONS REVERSED BECAUSE THE PROMOTING PROSTITUTION...

PROMOTING PROSTITUTION CONVICTIONS REVERSED BECAUSE THE PROMOTING PROSTITUTION COUNTS ARE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF SEX TRAFFICKING (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department dismissed the “promoting prostitution” counts of the indictment as inclusory concurrent counts of sex trafficking:

We note … that count 15 of the indictment, charging defendant with promoting prostitution in the second degree (Penal Law § 230.30 [1]), is an inclusory concurrent count of sex trafficking as charged in counts 12, 13, and 14 (§ 230.34 [5] [a], [c], [h]; see generally CPL 1.20 [37]; 300.30 [4]). Similarly, count 24 of the indictment, charging defendant with promoting prostitution in the second degree, is an inclusory concurrent count of sex trafficking as charged in counts 21, 22, and 23. We therefore conclude that counts 15 and 24 must be dismissed as a matter of law because defendant was found guilty of counts 12 through 14 and 21 through 23, and “a verdict of guilty upon the greater [counts] is deemed a dismissal of every lesser [inclusory concurrent count]” … . People v Spencer, 2024 NY Slip Op 01448, Fourth Dept 3-15-25

Practice Point: If a defendant is convicted of sex trafficking and promoting prostitution, the promoting prostitution convictions must be reversed as inclusory concurrent counts of sex trafficking.

 

You might also like
Plaintiff, a Pedestrian, Was Injured When a Traffic Sign Struck by a Car Broke Off and Hit Her—County Owed Plaintiff a Duty to Properly Install the Sign—Question of Fact Raised Whether Improper Installation of a “Break Away” Sign Was a Proximate Cause of the Plaintiff’s Injuries
Incorrect Information About Sentencing Provided to the Defendant by the Court and Counsel Warranted Vacating the Plea In the Absence of Preservation
PROBATION CONDITIONS PROHIBITING POSSESSION OF A COMPUTER AND A CELL PHONE WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE; DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ABUSE FIRST DEGREE (FOURTH DEPT).
WITNESS TAMPERING CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL REVERSED; NO CHARGES WERE PENDING AT THE TIME OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE WITNESS (FOURTH DEPT).
THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED INQUIRY TO ENSURE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE SORA HEARING WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY; THE NOTICE OF THE SORA HEARING PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT WAS INADEQUATE (FOURTH DEPT).
DUE TO NEGLIGENCE BY A TIRE SHOP WHICH CONCEDED LIABILITY, A WHEEL FLEW OFF DEFENDANT’S CAR AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR, DEFENDANT-DRIVER’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.
Bank Was Not a Statutory Lien Law Trustee; Question of Fact Whether Bank Was Aware Funds Were Diverted Lien Law Trust Funds
EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED DURING A WARRANTLESS PAROLE SEARCH AT A TIME WHEN DEFENDANT’S POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) HAD BEEN IMPOSED ADMINISTRATIVELY, WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL; BECAUSE THE LAW CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF PRS IS NOW CLEAR, SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE NO DETERRENT EFFECT AND IS NOT THEREFORE NECESSARY (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURER WAS TIMELY NOTIFIED OF THE ASBESTOS-EXPOSURE... THE SUPPRESSION COURT APPLIED THE WRONG “DEBOUR” LEVEL TO THE INITIAL...