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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED CONSTRUCTION WORK ON DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY CAUSED WATER TO ENCROACH ON PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY; THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED BECAUSE THE CONSTRUCTION WORK WAS DONE MORE THAN THREE YEARS BEFORE THE ACTION WAS FILED; THE RELATED NUISANCE AND TRESPASS ACTIONS WERE NOT TIME-BARRED BECAUSE THEY MAY CONSTITUTE “CONTINUING WRONGS” (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligence cause of action was time-barred but the related nuisance and trespass actions constituted “continuing wrongs” and therefore were not time-barred. Plaintiff alleged defendant did construction work on defendant’s property which caused water to encroach on plaintiff’s property. Because the construction work was done more than three years before the action was filed, the negligence action was not timely:

The defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the negligence cause of action was barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214[4]) by submitting evidence that the allegedly negligent construction work performed on its property occurred in or around June 2012, more than four years prior to the commencement of this action … .

… Here, the acts of continuous nuisance and trespass alleged in the amended complaint may give rise to successive causes of action pursuant to the continuous wrong doctrine … . Jefferson v New Life Tabernacle, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 01295, Second Dept 3-13-24

Practice Point: Here construction work on defendant’s land was alleged to have caused water to encroach on plaintiff’s property. The negligence action accrued when the construction work was done and was time-barred. But the related nuisance and trespass actions may constitute “continuing wrongs” which were not time-barred.

 

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