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THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR A CLERK’S JUDGMENT FOR A SUM CERTAIN; DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HE WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS WITH NOTICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) the action for damages for medical services was not appropriate for a clerk’s judgment for a sum certain pursuant to CPLR 3215(a) and (2) defendant raised a question of fact about whether he was served with the summons with notice pursuant to CPLR 308(4):

… [T]he Clerk lacked authority under CPLR 3215 (a) to enter the default judgment. “CPLR 3215 (a) allows a party to seek a default judgment by application to the clerk if the claim is ‘for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain’ ” … . “The limitation of clerk’s judgments to claims for a sum certain contemplates a situation in which, once liability has been established, there can be no dispute as to the amount due” … . “The statute is intended to apply to only the most liquidated and undisputable of claims, such as actions on money judgments and negotiable instruments” … . Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this action, which seeks to recover damages for medical services, is not for a sum certain or for a sum that by computation can be made certain … . * * *

Defendant submitted an affidavit in which he averred, inter alia, that he lived in the upstairs apartment of a two-story, two-family house, and that, because his apartment was not specified on the papers described in the process server’s affidavit of service, he never received service … . State of New York v Walker, 2024 NY Slip Op 00716, Fourth Dept 2-9-24

Practice Point: An action for a clerk’s judgment for a sum certain is only appropriate where there is absolutely no dispute about the amount due, not here in a case seeking damages for medical services.

 

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