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PLAINTIFF SUED AN ILLINOIS SCHOOL ALLEGING THAT THE ONLINE COURSES OFFERED BY DEFENDANT SCHOOL DURING THE PANDEMIC CONSTITUTED A TRANSACTION IN NEW YORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LONG-ARM STATUTE; BUT PLAINTIFF DID NOT ALLEGE SHE WAS IN NEW YORK WHEN SHE TOOK THE ONLINE COURSES; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about whether defendant, an Illinois school, conducted a transaction in New York sufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction. Because of the pandemic, the courses offered by the school were online. Plaintiff alleged a breach of contract by the school involving a grading issue. A major flaw in plaintiff’s case was that she did not allege she was in New York when she took the online courses:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to show that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in New York so as to subject them to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) … . While the plaintiff attests in her affidavit that since March 2020, she has not taken a class at the defendants’ Illinois location, that the only contact she had with the defendants since that date was either virtually or by telephone, and that none of the facts alleged in her complaint took place in person in Illinois, none of this demonstrates that the defendants were engaged in any activity in New York, let alone purposeful activity. Other than the plaintiff’s allegation that she is a New York resident, there is no other reference to New York in the complaint or in the plaintiff’s affidavit. Significantly, the plaintiff’s allegations are devoid of any indication that she was in New York during the time of the alleged communications with the defendants. Greenfader v Chicago Sch. of Professional Psychology, 2023 NY Slip Op 06513, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: It is not clear from the decision whether taking an online course in New York offered by a school in Illinois confers long-arm jurisdiction over the school. Granting the school’s motion to dismiss appears to be based upon the plaintiff’s failure to allege she was in New York when she took the online course.

 

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