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A CANINE SNIFF FOR DRUGS IS A SEARCH; ALTHOUGH THE APPELLATE DIVISION HAD ALSO RULED THE CANINE SNIFF WAS A SEARCH, THE APPELLATE DIVISION WENT ON TO APPLY THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” STANDARD AND FOUND THAT STANDARD HAD BEEN MET BY THE FACTS; THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THE APPELLATE DIVISION DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RULE ADVERSELY TO THE DEFENDANT ON THE STANDARD BECAUSE COUNTY COURT HAD NOT RULED ON THAT ISSUE (COUNTY COURT HELD THE SNIFF WAS NOT A SEARCH); THE MATTER WAS SENT BACK TO COUNTY COURT FOR RULINGS ON THE STANDARD FOR A SNIFF SEARCH (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a comprehensive opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined that a canine sniff of a person to detect drugs is a search. The Fourth Department had reversed County Court and held that the canine sniff constituted a search. But the Fourth Department went on to apply the “reasonable suspicion” standard to whether the search was justified and found that standard had been met by the facts. Because County Count had not ruled on the correct standard for a sniff-search (County Court held the sniff was not a search), the Fourth Department did not have the authority rule against the defendant on that issue. The matter was sent back to County Court for rulings on what the correct standard is and whether that standard was met by the events preceding the sniff-search in this case:

… [W]e conclude that the canine sniff of defendant’s person qualified as a search under the Fourth Amendment. * * *

The second question presented by this appeal is whether the Appellate Division could decide that a canine sniff search of a person requires reasonable suspicion and was justified in this case. We conclude that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to resolve those issues because County Court did not decide them adversely to defendant (see LaFontaine, 92 NY2d at 473-474). * * *

County Court held that the canine sniff of defendant’s person did not qualify as a search. The court did not decide the standard that would govern if the canine sniff did so qualify, much less whether that standard was met. Those questions present “separate” and “analytically distinct” issues from the threshold question of whether the sniff implicated constitutional protections or prohibitions … . The Appellate Division therefore erred in deciding those questions adversely to defendant…. . People v Butler, 2023 NY Slip Op 06468, CtApp 12-19-23

Practice Point: A canine sniff for drugs on a person is a search. The correct standard justifying such a search has not been determined.

Practice Point: If an issue has not been addressed by the lower court, the appellate court is powerless to rule adversely to the defendant on that issue. Here County Court had held that a canine sniff is not a search and therefore never ruled on the correct standard for such a search. The Appellate Division (which reversed County Court on whether the sniff is a search) could not decide what the correct standard for the search was and then rule that the standard had been met, because that ruling was adverse to the defendant. The matter was sent back to the County Court for a ruling.

 

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