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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED ASSAULT AND BATTERY BY POLICE OFFICERS; THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE ASSAULT AND BATTERY IS INTENTIONAL, NOT NEGLIGENT, CONDUCT; THE IMMUNITY AFFORDED POLICE OFFICERS RE: ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXTENDS ONLY TO “OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE” CONDUCT; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE POLICE CONDUCT WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligence cause of action against the county based upon the alleged assault and battery of plaintiff by police officers should have been dismissed. Assault and battery stem from intentional, not negligent, acts. The assault and battery allegations properly survived summary judgment, however:

… [T]he defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action alleging negligence by submitting, inter alia, a transcript of the plaintiff’s testimony at a General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing, in which she testified that a police officer grabbed her, picked her up, and threw her to the ground, causing her injuries. Where, as here, intentional offensive conduct has been established, the actor may be found liable for assault or battery, but not negligence … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether any of her alleged injuries were caused by unintentional conduct … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging negligence.

However, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging assault and battery. Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity on state law claims if their actions are “objectively reasonable” … . The determination of whether a use of force was objectively reasonable is an “intensely factual” question “best left for a jury to decide” … . Here, the defendants’ submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the police officer’s actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Pleva v County of Suffolk, 2023 NY Slip Op 06394, Second Dept 12-13-23

Practice Point: Allegations of intentional conduct, here assault and battery, will not support a negligence cause of action.

Practice Point: Police officers have immunity which will protect them from allegations of assault and battery, but only if the police conduct was “objectively reasonable” (a question of fact).

 

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