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ALTHOUGH THE BACKHOE WHICH COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE HAD BEEN USED FOR ROADWORK THAT DAY, AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE BACKHOE WAS BEING USED TO TRANSPORT GRAVEL TO THE WORK SITE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE BACKHOE WAS NOT “ACTIVELY ENGAGED” IN ROADWORK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND, THEREFORE, THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD FOR LIABILITY IN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county employee who rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle with a backhoe was not engaged in road construction work within the meaning of the Vehicle and Traffic Law at the time of the accident and, therefore, was not subject to the higher “reckless disregard” standard for liability. Although the backhoe had been used to repair a road, at the time of the accident the backhoe was transporting gravel to the work site. The Second Department determined transporting gravel was did not meet the definition of being “actively engaged” in construction work:

… [W]e conclude that the defendant driver was not actually engaged in work on a highway at the time of the accident …, because the act of transporting gravel to a highway worksite does not itself constitute construction, repair, maintenance, or similar work on a highway … . When a vehicle travels on a highway to transport equipment or materials, the road itself is not being worked on; instead, the road is being used for its intended purpose of facilitating travel. Moreover, the mere transporting of materials or equipment is different in kind from acts that have been deemed to constitute work “on” a highway, such as clearing or cleaning the road or its shoulder … , or actively assessing the conditions of the road or searching for a reported hazard on the road … . …

​… [T]he defendants do not contend that the mere transporting of construction materials on a public road will in every instance constitute being actually engaged in work on a highway. Rather, in advancing their claim, the defendants contend that the defendant driver’s transport of materials fell within the scope of the statute because the defendant driver had been repairing a roadbed on the day of the collision and had not yet completed his work for the day. We disagree. The defendants’ position is inconsistent with the statute’s use of the phrase “actually engaged” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103[b]), as reflected in the plain language of the statute and its interpretation by the courts. Qosaj v Village of Sleepy Hollow, 2023 NY Slip Op 06395, Second Dept 12-13-23

Practice Point: A road-construction vehicle involved in an accident will not be subject to the higher “reckless disregard” standard of liability unless the vehicle is “actively engaged” in roadwork at the time of the accident. Transporting gravel to the work site is not considered “active engagement.”

 

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