You are here: / / IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED...
,

IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end traffic accident cause should have been granted. Defendant’s allegation plaintiff stopped suddenly did not raise a question of fact:

It is well established that a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle … .

… [D]efendant failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Defendant failed to establish that she maintained a safe following distance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] … ) and that any repeated braking by plaintiff was not foreseeable due to the existence of the construction zone and 15 mile per hour speed limit. Defendant failed to establish that given the circumstances she could have “reasonably expected that traffic would continue unimpeded” … . While defendant claims that plaintiff made a sudden stop, a “claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence” … . Ahmad v Behal, 2023 NY Slip Op 06196, First Dept 11-30-23

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, alleging the car in front stopped suddenly does not defeat the presumption that the rear driver was negligent.

 

You might also like
THE QUESTIONNAIRES FILLED OUT BY APPLICANTS FOR CITY JUDICIAL POSITIONS WERE PROTECTED FROM THE FOIL REQUEST BY THE PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION; AN APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER AN UNPRESERVED ISSUE IN AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEVER THE TWO OFFENSES, WHICH OCCURRED ON DIFFERENT DATES AND WERE UNRELATED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPENDED UPON WHETHER THE INJURED RESPONDENT RESIDED WITH HIS SON IN MAINE; RESPONDENT ALLEGED HE SPLIT HIS TIME BETWEEN RESIDING IN NEW YORK AND RESIDING WITH HIS SON; A PERSON MAY HAVE MORE THAN ONE RESIDENCE; A FRAMED-ISSUE HEARING WAS REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).
PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT).
Conviction Based Upon Plea Where Defendant Was Not Advised of the Period of Postrelease Supervision Is Unconstitutional for Predicate Felony Purposes—Catu Applied Retroactively
POSSIBLE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUS IGNORANCE DOCTRINE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MUTUAL MISTAKE ACTION.
Money Paid Into Court in Conjunction with Stay Pending Appeal Does Not Stop Accruing of Interest Until Prevailing Party is Paid
Proof that a Floor is Inherently Slippery, Standing Alone, Will Not Support a Negligence Cause of Action

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE RIGHT TO SEEK REMOVAL OF A CLOUD ON TITLE IS NEVER BARRED BY A STATUTE OF... AN ESCAPE LADDER BOLTED TO THE CEILING OF A PERSONNEL HOIST DETACHED AND FELL...