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WHERE, AS HERE, THE SORA COURT EXPRESSLY FINDS THERE WAS NO SEXUAL CONDUCT OR MOTIVE UNDERLYING THE UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT OF A CHILD, THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANT BE DESIGNATED A SEX OFFENDER VIOLATES DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissent, determined requiring defendant to register as a sex offender based upon an nonsexual unlawful imprisonment of a child violated defendant’s right to due process of law:

Defendant stole money at gunpoint from his aunt in the presence of his 10-year-old cousin for which he pleaded guilty to, inter alia, the unlawful imprisonment of the child. For this crime, New York requires that he register as a sex offender and comply with the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). It is undisputed that the crime was non-sexual and that the SORA court found that defendant is not a sex offender and poses no sexual threat. Nevertheless, the courts below felt constrained by People v Knox (12 NY3d 60 [2009]) to impose SORA requirements. Defendant contends that the holdings in Knox and its companion cases are distinguishable and do not control his as-applied challenge. We agree and conclude that requiring defendant to register violates his due process rights and does nothing to further the legislative purpose of SORA to protect the public from actual sex offenders. * * *

… [T]he core holding and reasoning in Knox does not control here where defendant’s criminal behavior and his lack of future risk of sexual harm to children distinguish him from the Knox defendants. The Knox Court’s conclusion that designating those three defendants as sex offenders and mandating their SORA registration was rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting children from sexual assault lacks force here, where defendant’s offense belies any such threat. Where a SORA court expressly finds that there was no sexual conduct or motive and no risk of future sexual offense, application of the sex offender label cannot be justified on the ground that a defendant may pose a risk of future sexual misconduct, and there is no further administrative burden in reaching that conclusion. Applying SORA to defendant violates his due process rights by impinging on his liberty interest to be free of the improper designation and registration as a “sex offender.”  People v Brown, 2023 NY Slip Op 05973, CtApp 11-21-23

Practice Point: Here the SORA court found there was no sexual conduct or motive underlying the unlawful imprisonment of the child. Under that circumstance, to designate the defendant a sex offender violates his right to due process of law.

 

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