You are here: / / THE TOWN ZONING BOARD SHOULD NOT HAVE INTERPRETED THE TERM “SINGLE...
, , ,

THE TOWN ZONING BOARD SHOULD NOT HAVE INTERPRETED THE TERM “SINGLE FAMILY DWELLINGS” SUCH THAT SHORT TERM RENTALS WERE PROHIBITED BECAUSE TRANSIENT TENANTS DO NOT MEET THE DEFINITION OF “FAMILY” (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and annulling the zoning board’s (ZBA’s) ruling, determined the term “single family dwellings” should not have been interpreted to prohibit short-term rentals. The ZBA reasoned that short-term, transient tenants do not meet the definition of “family:”

“[L]ocal zoning boards have broad discretion, and [a] determination of a zoning board should be sustained on judicial review if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence” … . So long as a zoning board’s interpretation of its governing code “is neither ‘irrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing [code],’ it will be upheld” … . However, where, as here, the issue presented “is one of pure legal interpretation of [the code’s] terms, deference to the zoning board is not required” … . * * *

… [U]nder the Zoning Ordinance, the transient or temporary nature of a group is but one factor that “may” be considered to determine whether four or more persons who are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption are the “functional equivalent” of a “traditional family.” … [I]f petitioner rented her property to three or fewer persons, or to four or more persons who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption, those groups would meet the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of a “[f]amily” without regard to whether their tenancy was transient or temporary in nature. The ZBA’s determination to the contrary lacked a rational basis … , and the court erred in sustaining the determination. Matter of Friedman v Town of Dunkirk, 2023 NY Slip Op 05912, Fourth Dept 11-17-23

Practice Point: Where a zoning board purports to make a pure legal interpretation of terms used in the zoning code, a court’s deference to the zoning board is not required.

Practice Point: Here the zoning board’s interpretation of the term “family” within the phrase “single family residences” to exclude short-term rentals to transient tenants was irrational.

 

You might also like
THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION RENDERED DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION TO A PROBATION VIOLATION INVALID; THE ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE ADMISSION (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, DEFENSE COUNSEL RELIED ON A CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL ARGUMENT WHEN DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT).
INADEQUATE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL REQUIRED REVERSAL; PRESERVATION OF THIS ISSUE NOT NECESSARY.
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO A NONPARENT WITHOUT FIRST MAKING A FINDING WHETHER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED; THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, APPEAL HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (FOURTH DEPT).
CONSECUTIVE PERIODS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION VIOLATED THE PENAL LAW; ERROR DID NOT NEED TO BE PRESERVED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (ARIZONA) IN THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY AN ARGUMENT QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF A CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE; THE FACT THAT THE NEW YORK PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL TO ARIZONA DOES NOT AFFECT THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (FOURTH DEPT).
SOMEONE WAS TRYING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO DEFENDANT’S HOME AND SHE SHOT THROUGH THE DOOR, KILLING HER BOYFRIEND; DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A “LAWFUL TEMPORARY POSSESSION OF A WEAPON” JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; STRONG DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SAW WHAT WAS TO BE SEEN IN THIS BICYCLE-CAR COLLISION CASE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED, TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF, A PERMISSIVE DRIVER OF DEFENDANT’S TRUCK, WAS INJURED WHEN... ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFFS COULD HAVE COMMENCED THE LAWSUIT WITHIN THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE...