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THE “TIME WHEN” THE ALLEGED SEXUAL ABUSE TOOK PLACE IN 1997 WAS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED IN THE CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the claim in this Child Victims Act action sufficiently described when the alleged sexual abuse took place:

… [T]he Court of Claims incorrectly determined that the claim was insufficient to satisfy Court of Claims Act § 11(b)’s “time when” requirement … . The claimant’s allegations, including that the abuse occurred in approximately 1997 when she was approximately 15 years old by a named employee of the facility shortly after her arrival at the facility, provided sufficient information to enable the State to investigate and ascertain its liability under the circumstances … . Ford v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 05124, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: In Child Victims Act cases where the alleged sexual abuse took place decades ago, the courts are forgiving when determining the sufficiency of the “time when” allegations. Here the allegations claimant was abused by a named employee in 1997, when she was 15, shortly after her arrival at the facility, were deemed sufficient.

 

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