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IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE DRIVER OF THE REAR VEHICLE ALLEGED THE OTHER VEHICLE CHANGED LANES ABRUPTLY AND CAME TO A STOP IN FRONT OF HIM; THAT CONSTITUTED A NON-NEGLIGENT EXPLANATION WHICH RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end traffic accident case, determined defendant raised a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for his striking the car in front:

At his deposition, Guo Lin Wu [the driver of the United vehicle] testified that the Castillo/Lopez vehicle changed lanes abruptly in front of the United vehicle and then came to a sudden stop. Guo Lin Wu’s deposition testimony, if true, would constitute a nonnegligent explanation for his actions, and would establish that Castillo’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident … . The differing versions of events raised issues of credibility to be resolved by the factfinder … . Balanta v Guo Lin Wu, 2023 NY Slip Op 05111, Second Dept 10-11-23

Practice Point: Ordinarily a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle warrants summary judgment in favor of the stopped vehicle. Here the driver of the rear vehicle raised a question of fact by alleging the other vehicle changed lanes abruptly and stopped in front of him.

 

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