You are here: / / THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO RELIGIOUS ENTITIES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE...
,

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO RELIGIOUS ENTITIES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THEREFORE COURTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ADJUDICATING THE MATTER BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dispute between plaintiff church and defendant, which has some form of supervisory authority over plaintiff church, could not be adjudicated in a court pursuant to the First Amendment:

“The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs . . . Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution” … .

We conclude that none of the relief requested by plaintiff in its complaint may be decided by a court based on neutral principles of law … . Instead, resolution of those issues would “necessarily involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice” … . United Church of Friendship v New York Dist. of Assemblies of God, 2023 NY Slip Op 05090, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: Where the resolution of a dispute between religious entities requires a court to inquire into religious doctrine or practice, the First Amendment prohibits court involvement.

 

You might also like
A FOUNDED SUSPICION OF CRIMINALITY WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR A PAT SEARCH; HOWEVER THE SMELL OF MARIJUANA, ABOUT WHICH THE OFFICER TESTIFIED, WOULD JUSTIFY A SEARCH; BECAUSE THE SUPPRESSION COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE MARIJUANA-SMELL ISSUE, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A RULING (FOURTH DEPT).
PURSUANT TO THE “MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION,” THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT COMPLAINT BY A PRIEST AGAINST THE DIOCESE OF BUFFALO WAS DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE SORA HEARING JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED AN UPWARD DEPARTURE, INCREASING DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL, BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT IN THE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (RAI) OR RAISED BY THE PEOPLE AT THE HEARING; TO DO SO VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).
Sentencing a Defendant with a Prior Felony Conviction as a First-Time Felon Is Illegal
Excess Insurance Policies Re: Same Risk Cancel Out
COUNTY COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED THREE INDICTMENT COUNTS AFTER IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.
THE FIRST, THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS HAVE HELD THAT THE VIOLATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION 12 NYCRR 23-4.2 (K) WILL NOT SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HAS HELD THE VIOLATION OF THAT SAME PROVISION SUPPORTS A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE DID NOT WAIVE THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE BY SUBMITTING MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS TO THE SENTENCING COURT IN THE RELATED CRIMINAL CASE; THE RECORDS WERE SUBMITTED AS PART OF A MITIGATION REPORT WHICH IS DEEMED “CONFIDENTIAL” PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LYING TO AN INVESTIGATOR WHO RECORDS THE LIE IN A REPORT CANNOT BE THE BASIS... PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH HE FELL DID NOT HAVE GUARDRAILS;...