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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS DEFAULT IN THIS CUSTODY CASE; THE USUAL RULES FOR VACATION OF A DEFAULT ARE RELAXED IN CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined it was an abuse of discretion to deny father’s motion to vacate his default in this custody proceeding. The Second Department noted that the strict rules surrounding vacation of a default are relaxed in custody matters:

Although the determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court … , “the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings” … . Thus, the “general rule with respect to opening defaults in civil actions is not to be rigorously applied to cases involving child custody” … .

Under the circumstances presented here, including the brief period between the father’s default and his motion to vacate his default, and in light of the policy favoring resolutions on the merits in child custody proceedings, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the father’s motion to vacate the order of custody and parental access … entered upon his failure to appear … . Matter of Orobona v Cunningham, 2023 NY Slip Op 04594, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Because resolution on the merits is the policy favored in child custody matters, the usual rules surrounding vacation of a default are relaxed.

 

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