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DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EXPERT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, PLAINTIFF WAS GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should not have been precluded from presenting expert evidence at trial. The Second Department noted that there is no rigid time requirement for the notice of the intent to present expert testimony and plaintiff was provided with the nature of the expert’s opinion prior to setting the trial date:

“CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) requires a party, upon request, to identify the expert witnesses the party expects to call at trial” … . However, CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) “does not require a response at any particular time or mandate that a party be precluded from proffering expert testimony merely because of noncompliance with the statute” … .

Here, the defendant served his expert notice prior to a trial date being set, and thus it was not untimely … . Further, the notice was not deficient. It identified the expert witness, indicated that he was a vocational expert, and included the expert’s qualifications. Although the notice did not include the expert’s opinion and grounds for that opinion, that information was in the draft report that was received by the plaintiff prior to the trial date being set (see CPLR 3101[d]).

The defendant also complied with the requirements set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.16(g) by disclosing his expert witness shortly after the expert had been retained … and serving the expert report more than 60 days before trial (see 22 NYCRR 202.16[g][2]). Giovinazzo-Varela v Varela, 2023 NY Slip Op 04441, Second Dept 8-30-23

Practice Point: There is no strict time-limit for providing notice of the intent to present expert evidence and the nature of that evidence. Here defendant provided plaintiff with timely notice and the expert evidence should not have been precluded.

 

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