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THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (RPTL), NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS THE COMMENCEMENT OF A REAL PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city in this property tax foreclosure proceeding properly followed the procedure for commencing the action prescribed in the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) (as opposed to the CPLR procedure):

Real Property Tax Law provides that a proceeding for the foreclosure of tax liens in rem shall be commenced in the manner provided in Real Property Tax Law article 11, title 3 (see id. § 1120). Title 3 sets forth specific requirements for public notice by publication and personal notice to owners and other persons with a right, title, or interest in affected properties (see id. §§ 1124, 1125). RPTL 1125(3)(c) provides that the service required by that section “shall be deemed to be equivalent to the service of a notice of petition pursuant to [CPLR 403]” … . Thus, the City was required to comply with the service requirements set forth in the Real Property Tax Law, rather than those set forth in the CPLR … . The City established that it satisfied the notice and service requirements set forth in the Real Property Tax Law and that it is entitled to a default judgment with respect to the parcels of real property identified in the City’s motion (see RPTL 1131, 1136[3]). Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens (City of Newburgh), 2023 NY Slip Op 04381, Second Dept 8-23-23

Practice Point: The procedure for commencing a real property tax foreclosure action is prescribed by the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL), not the CPLR.

 

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