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THE FOR CAUSE CHALLENGES TO TWO JURORS WHO SAID THEY WOULD TEND TO BELIEVE THE TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined that two jurors who stated they would tend to believe the testimony of police officers should have been excused for cause:

The first prospective juror stated in response to a question concerning police officers that she “was raised to respect them” and that, because “they’re the people that are protecting you, you should trust them.” When further probed about weighing the credibility of a police officer’s testimony against a defendant’s testimony, she stated that she would “most likely [believe] the police officer.” The second prospective juror stated that, because of his work as an emergency medical technician, he saw police “in a very positive light.” When asked the same question about whose version of events he would believe, the prospective juror stated “[t]o be completely honest, probably the first responder police officer.”

Further, both prospective jurors repeated that they would likely believe a police officer’s account of an event over a defendant’s version after the court attempted to rehabilitate them … . Thus, their respective affirmative answers when the court asked them if they could be fair and impartial were “insufficient to constitute . . . unequivocal declaration[s]” that they could set aside their stated bias in favor of police officers … . After the court denied his challenges for cause, defendant used peremptory challenges to remove the two prospective jurors from the venire and, therefore, “[b]ecause defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges before the completion of jury selection, reversal is required” … . People v Smith, 2023 NY Slip Op 03647, Fourth Dept 6-30-23

Practice Point: Here the for cause challenges to two jurors who said they would tend to believe the testimony of police officers should have been granted. Because defendant exhausted all peremptory challenges, reversal was required. The fact that the jurors said they could be fair and impartial was not enough to warrant denial of the challenges.

 

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