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SENDING THE 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE TO THE TWO BORROWERS IN THE SAME ENVELOPE VIOLATED RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined sending the notice of foreclosure to the two borrowers in the same envelope violated RAPL 1304 which must be strictly complied with:

RPAPL 1304(1) provides that, “at least ninety days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower, . . . including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower.” “The statute further provides the required content for the notice and provides that the notice must be sent by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower” … . Strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 notice to the borrower is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not comply with RPAPL 1304, since the 90-day notice was jointly addressed to both of the defendants … . Moreover, while the plaintiff contends that two identical copies of the notice were included in the mailing, one for each of the defendants, the plaintiff concedes that they were mailed in the same envelope, which was also improper … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Schneider, 2023 NY Slip Op 02869, Second Dept 5-31-23

Practice Point: To warrant summary judgment in a foreclosure action the bank must demonstrate strict compliance with RPAPL 1304. Here the statute was violated by sending the 90-day foreclosure notice to both borrowers in the same envelope.

 

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