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PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WEARING A HARD HAT AND WAS STRUCK IN THE HEAD BY DEBRIS DURING DEMOLITION WORK; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE HEAD PROTECTION VIOLATED THE INDUSTRIAL CODE GIVING RISE TO A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE JOB WAS NOT A HARD HAT JOB; THEREFORE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was struck in the head by falling debris. The Industrial Code regulation requiring a hard hat was not demonstrated to be inapplicable by the defendant:

… Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the defendants’ motions which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1). “In order to prevail on a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), the plaintiff must establish that the job was a ‘hard hat’ job, and that the plaintiff’s failure to wear a hard hat was a proximate cause of his [or her] injury” … . Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the demolition work associated with the house renovation was not a hard hat job, and that the plaintiff’s lack of head protection did not play a role in the injuries he sustained when he was struck in the head by a piece of wood … .Reyes v Sligo Constr. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 01699, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: Failure to provide a worker with hard hat may support a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action.

 

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