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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE POLICE ANNOUNCED THEIR PURPOSE (ARREST WARRANT) BEFORE ENTERING THE APARTMENT; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the suppression motion should have been granted because there was no evidence the police announced their purpose (arrest warrant) before entering the apartment:

The hearing evidence supports findings as follows: The police executing the arrest warrant knocked and heard movement in the apartment but received no response, they announced that they were police and again received no response, and they then entered the apartment after finding that the door was unlocked. Only after opening the door, and after entering the apartment, a detective announced, “NYPD arrest warrant.” There was no evidence that in any way suggests that the police, before entering the apartment, attempted to satisfy the statutory requirement of giving “notice” of their “purpose” (CPL 120.80[4] …). Accordingly, the court should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence at issue. People v Jones, 2023 NY Slip Op 01262. First Dept 3-14-23

Practice Point: The did not comply with the statutory requirement that they announce their purpose, here the execution of an arrest warrant, before entering the apartment. The motion to suppress should have been granted.

 

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