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THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS SCHOOL PLAYGROUND ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SCHOOL HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISION CLAIM AND PETITIONER DID NOT OFFER A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the school board should not have been granted. Petitioner alleged her child was not properly supervised at recess. The child apparently ran into a piece of equipment when being chased by classmates. There was an accident report and the three recess supervisors indicated they did not see the incident. The Second Department held that the school did not have timely notice of the potential claim and petitioner did not have an adequate excuse for failing to timely file:

… [T]he accident claim form states that three school employees were supervising recess but did not see the infant petitioner become injured. This, standing alone, is insufficient to establish actual knowledge of a potential negligent supervision claim because it is well established that schools “‘cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students'” …  The petitioners also failed to establish that the School Board had actual knowledge of the facts constituting their other two claims … . The petitioners identify no factual connection between the recess supervisors not seeing the infant petitioner’s injury and either the allegedly defective nature of the playground equipment or the instruction given or not given to students at recess. It is not even clear from the description of the incident on the accident claim form whether the school was aware that the infant petitioner injured himself on a “metal joint” as alleged in the petition and the notice of claim. Thus, the petitioners failed to establish that the School Board had actual knowledge of the facts constituting their claims … . Matter of R. M. v Board of Educ. of the Long Beach City Sch. Dist., 2023 NY Slip Op 00320, Second Dept 1-25-23

Practice Point: Here the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted in this school-playground accident case. There was an accident report but the report did not demonstrate the school had timely knowledge of the potential lawsuit. in addition, petitioner did not offer a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file.

 

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