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THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211(A)(1); THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. The employer argued the defendant-employee was driving his own car and was not operating the car in the course of his employment. The evidence submitted by the employer was not “documentary evidence” which would support a motion to dismiss:

“A motion to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . “[T]o be considered ‘documentary,’ evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity” … . “[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case” … . “Neither affidavits, deposition testimony, nor letters are considered documentary evidence within the intendment of CPLR 3211(a)(1)” … . Davis v Henry, 2023 NY Slip Op 00076, Second Dept 1-11-23

Practice Point: “Documentary evidence” which will support a motion to dismiss include mortgages, deeds, contracts, etc., not affidavits, deposition testimony or letters.

 

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