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RESETTLEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS PROPER ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF CORRECTING A MISTAKE IN THE JUDGMENT; RESETTLEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN USED TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the judgment of divorce should have been resettled to the extent that the judgment conform with the stipulation. But the judgment should not have been modified to include a provision which was not in the stipulation. Resettlement cannot be used to amend the judgment, as opposed to correcting a mistake:

Resettlement of a judgment of divorce pursuant to CPLR 5019(a) is an appropriate remedy when the judgment does not accurately incorporate the terms of a stipulation of settlement … . Here, although the judgment of divorce provided that the defendant was responsible for providing health insurance for the parties’ children, that provision was inconsistent with the terms of the stipulation. Specifically, the stipulation contained a provision which set forth that the plaintiff was responsible for providing health insurance for the parties’ children through her employer unless she became unemployed, and then the defendant would be responsible for providing health insurance for them through his employer. …

… Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to resettle the judgment of divorce to the extent it sought to replace the provision requiring the defendant to provide health insurance for the parties’ children with a provision requiring the plaintiff to be solely responsible to provide health insurance for the parties’ children … . The amendment proposed by the defendant failed to comport with the terms of the stipulation regarding the responsibility of the parties as to the health insurance for their children and was a substantive modification beyond the court’s inherent authority to correct a mistake, defect, or irregularity in the original judgment “not affecting a substantial right of a party” (CPLR 5019[a] …). Ferrigan v Ferrigan, 2022 NY Slip Op 07058, Second Dept 12-14-22

Practice Point: Here resettlement of the judgment of divorce pursuant to CPLR 5019 was appropriate only to the extent of correcting a mistake by conforming the judgment to the stipulation. Resettlement should not have been used to amend the judgment to include a provision which was not in the stipulation.

 

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