You are here: / / PLAINTIFF BANK’S 2017 DE-ACCELERATION LETTER IN THIS FORECLOSURE...
,

PLAINTIFF BANK’S 2017 DE-ACCELERATION LETTER IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE SERVED TO STOP THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TRIGGERED BY THE INITIAL FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2012; THEREFORE THE SECOND FORECLOSURE ACTION BROUGHT IN 2018 WAS TIMELY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Fisher, determined plaintiff bank’s 2017 de-acceleration letter was not ambiguous and served to stop the running of the statute of limitations triggered when the mortgage loan was accelerated by initial the 2012 foreclosure action:

… [P]laintiff submitted … a copy of the September 27, 2018 de-acceleration notice sent by the mortgage servicer, indicating that “we hereby revoke any prior acceleration of the loan, withdrawing any prior demand for immediate payment of all sums secured by the security instrument and re-institute the loan as an installment loan” … . The notice advised that defendants could resume making monthly payments, which would now be accepted by plaintiff, and further provided that defendants “also have the right to pay the monthly payments that came due prior to and would have come due during the prior acceleration, which has not been revoked.” …

Supreme Court found, that this … language — “which has not been revoked” — made the entire notice unclear and ambiguous, we disagree. Such statement was advising defendants of their right to satisfy the arrears and their continuing obligation to make monthly payments; the next sentence in the notice warned that, if defendants failed to “cure the payments in arrears,” plaintiff reserved the right “to accelerate the loan anew.” To this end, defendants’ claim that this language is inconsistent with the monthly statements sent before and after the de-acceleration notice is belied by the record, which confirms that such statements sought payment on the total amount of the arrears plus the monthly mortgage payment, and not the total principal of the mortgage. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. v Bresler, 2022 NY Slip Op 06671, Third Dept 11-23-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, a de-acceleration letter will stop the running of the statute of limitations as long as the letter is clear and unambiguous. Here Supreme Court found the letter ambiguous and, therefore, ineffective; but the Third Department disagreed.

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT WAS NOT ‘DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPLR 3211, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED UPON ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT (THIRD DEPT).
Town Planning Board’s Approval of the Installation of Wind Turbines Should Not Have Been Reversed—Board Properly Considered All the Factors Mandated by the Land Use Ordinance and Supreme Court Did Not Have the Authority to Substitute Its Judgment for the Board’s
THE VOTERS WHOSE ABSENTEE BALLOTS WERE CHALLENGED ON RESIDENCY GROUNDS ARE NECESSARY PARTIES WHO WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PROCEEDING; THE ELECTION LAW PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGING THE ABSENTEE BALLOTS WERE NOT FOLLOWED; MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).
ANOMALY IN GUIDELINES MAY RESULT IN AN OVERESTIMATION OF THE CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY-BASED RISK, CASE REMITTED FOR FINDINGS.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF ACTED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES FROM THE BREAKDOWN OF EQUIPMENT IN THIS BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE CASE (THIRD DEPT).
PLAINTIFF RADIATION ONCOLOGIST, THE SOLE SHAREHOLDER IN PLANTIFF PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION, WHICH PAID PLAINTIFF ONCOLOGIST’S SALARY, SUCCESSFULLY SUED THE HOSPITAL WHICH EMPLOYED HIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; THE COURT, IN A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, HELD THAT PLAINTIFF’S SALARY WAS NOT A CORPORATE EXPENSE AND THEREFORE WAS RECOVERABLE AS LOST PROFITS IN THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (THIRD DEPT).
MEDICAL PROVIDER’S REQUEST FOR A VARIANCE ALLOWING PAYMENT FOR CLAIMANT’S TREATMENT WITH MEDICAL MARIJUANA SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FOR PROSPECTIVE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN (THIRD DEPT).
TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO COMPEL THE WITNESS WHO ASSERTED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO TESTIFY OR TO ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE IN FRONT OF THE JURY (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

IN THIS MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY PROCEEDING, MOTHER’S PROOF OF THE CHILD’S... PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW SECTION 511, THE NEW YORK CITY SUPPER CLUB WAS NOT THE...