You are here: / / SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANTS’ SOLE-PROXIMATE-CAUSE...

SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANTS’ SOLE-PROXIMATE-CAUSE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment dismissing defendants’ sole-proximate-cause affirmative defense to the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff used an eight-foot A-frame ladder to work on an overhead door mechanism and stood on the second to the highest step. The dissenters argued there was a question of fact whether the plaintiff’s own negligence (standing on the second to the highest step) was the sole proximate cause of the fall. The majority found Supreme Court properly dismissed the sole-proximate-cause affirmative defense. Plaintiff submitted expert evidence that the eight-foot ladder was not an adequate safety device. And plaintiff’s standing on the second to the highest step spoke to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. With respect to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability, Supreme Court properly held there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was performing routine maintenance, which is not covered under Labor Law 240(1):

… [T]here is no evidence in the record that contradicts the opinion of plaintiff’s expert that the eight-foot A-frame ladder provided to plaintiff was inadequate because it could not have been placed so as to provide proper protection to plaintiff during his work on the bearing and shaft of the car wash overhead door at the time of the accident (see generally Labor Law § 240 [1]). Plaintiff therefore established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the sole proximate cause affirmative defense; any failure by plaintiff to refrain from standing on the top steps of the ladder amounts to no more than comparative negligence, which is not a defense under Labor Law § 240 (1) … . * * *

From the dissent:

Inasmuch as unnecessarily standing on the second step from the top of an A-frame ladder constitutes misuse of such a ladder, and plaintiff was depicted standing on the ladder in that manner just before the fall, we conclude that plaintiff’s submissions raised an issue of fact whether it was necessary for plaintiff to be on that step in order to perform his work on the 10-foot overhead door and, if not, whether plaintiff’s own actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Green v Evergreen Family Ltd. Partnership, 2022 NY Slip Op 06588, Fourth Dept 11-18-22

Practice Point: Here the majority concluded the A-frame ladder was inadequate for the job and plaintiff’s standing on the second to the highest step amounted to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Two dissenters argued there was a question of fact whether standing on the second to the highest step constituted plaintiff’s misuse of the ladder which was the sole proximate cause of the fall.

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A HORSE DURING A RIDING LESSON, NEITHER THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE NOR THE SIGNED RELEASED WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT HORSE FARM, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY GRANTED, NOTICE FILED PROMPTLY AFTER CLAIMANTS LEARNED THE WATER AUTHORITY CREATED THE DEFECT IN THE ROADWAY.
FATHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT MAKING A DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS, MATTER REMITTED; THE USUAL PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARDING CUSTODY TO A NONPARENT DO NOT APPLY TO A TEMPORARY PLACEMENT WITH A NONPARENT (FOURTH DEPT).
THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEDED TO DEFENDANT’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY NOT BE INSTRUCTED ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, AND, BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S BEHAVIOR, THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A COMPETENCY EXAMINATION.
DECEDENT, WHO DIED TESTATE IN 2004, WAS AWARDED COMPENSATION BY CONGRESS IN 2015 BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN HELD IN IRAN AS A HOSTAGE FROM 1979 TO 1981; BECAUSE THE COMPENSATION WAS AWARDED AFTER HER DEATH, IT DOES NOT PASS BY WILL, BUT RATHER BY THE LAWS OF INTESTACY (FOURTH DEPT).
In Lead Paint Exposure Case, Court’s Order to Provide Medical Report Linking Injuries to Exposure Before Depositions Upheld
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT INSURER BREACHED THE INSURANCE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE COVERAGE; THAT ALLEGATION DOES NOT SUPPORT AN ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER OF METAL ROOFING WAS A CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) BECAUSE IT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK, EVEN IF IT DID NOT DO SO; PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A ROOF WHERE THE METAL ROOFING WAS BEING INSTALLED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

A CHILD IN A CUSTODY PROCEEDING IS ENTITLED TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL... ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE...