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THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) DID NOT CHARGE DEFENDANT WITH CREATING AND FAILING TO REGISTER AN INTERNET IDENTIFIER, WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF THE CORRECTION LAW; INSTEAD, THE SCI CHARGED DEFENDANT WITH FAILURE TO REGISTER A FACEBOOK ACCOUNT, WHICH DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CORRECTION LAW (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the superior court information (SCI) determined that the SCI did not charge defendant with an violation of Correction Law section 168-a (18). The statute requires a sex offender to register the creation of an “Internet identifier.” But the SCI charged defendant with creating a Facebook account, which is not prohibited:

… [T]he SCI did not charge defendant with failing to register or report a change in an Internet identifier; instead, defendant was solely charged with failing to report a change in Internet status in violation of Correction Law § 168-f (4). Even assuming, without deciding, that the generalized language employed — failing to report a change in Internet status — coupled with the statutory reference otherwise would be sufficient to allege the material elements of the crime charged … , such reference was effectively negated “by the inclusion of conduct that [did] not constitute the crime charged” … — namely, “establishing a Facebook account.”

The governing statutes were written, and have been interpreted, narrowly. It has been clearly established “that the existence of a Facebook account — as opposed to the Internet identifiers a sex offender may use to access Facebook or interact with other users on Facebook — need not be disclosed to DCJS [Division of Criminal Justice Services] pursuant to Correction Law § 168-f (4)” … . Hence, the mere fact that defendant established a Facebook account was not an occurrence that defendant was required to report to DCJS, and his failure to do so did not constitute a violation of Correction Law § 168-f (4) … . * * *

… [T]he People did not charge defendant with failing to register an Internet identifier; they charged him with failing to report a change in Internet status, i.e., “establishing a Facebook account.” Stated differently, instead of “correctly alleg[ing] that the omission constituting the offense was [defendant’s] failure to register an Internet identifier used by him to access and identify himself on the Facebook account that he created and maintained, [the SCI] improperly premise[d] the charge on his failure to register the Facebook account itself” … . People v Ferretti, 2022 NY Slip Op 06030, Third Dept 10-27-22

Practice Point: Here the superior court information (SCI) did not charge defendant with an offense. If the SCI had charged defendant with failing to register an Internet identifier, the SCI would have charged an offense. Bu the SCI only charged defendant with failing to register a Facebook account, which is not an offense.

 

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