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THE CERTIFICATION OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THE DECEDENT EXECUTED THE CONTRACT, BUT THAT EVIDENCE CREATES ONLY A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION; PLAINTIFF PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DECEDENT SIGNED THE AGREEMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the certification of acknowledgment is prima facie proof the contract was executed by decedent but the certification only creates a rebuttable presumption:

… [T]he agreement was notarized by defendant Rosemary Bellini. “Certification of the acknowledgment or proof of a writing . . . in the manner prescribed by law for taking and certifying the acknowledgment or proof of a conveyance of real property within the state is prima facie evidence that it was executed by the person who purported to do so” (CPLR 4538). * * *

“The certification of acknowledgment becomes prima facie evidence that the writing was executed by the person who acknowledged having done so. [This] [p]rima facie evidence” is not conclusive; rather, it “creates a rebuttable presumption” … .  Plaintiff marshalled considerable evidence casting doubt on whether decedent actually signed the purported agreement and, if so, whether he knew or understood what he was signing. Thus, plaintiff should be given a chance to rebut the presumption created by Bellini’s notarization … . Langbert v Aconsky, 2022 NY Slip Op 06067, First Dept 10-27-22

Practice Point: Here the certification of acknowledgment was prima facie proof decedent signed the agreement but that proof only creates a rebuttable presumption. But plaintiff raised a question of fact whether decedent actually executed the agreement.

 

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