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THE BROKER WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND THEREFORE WAS ENTITLED TO THE AGREED 4% COMMISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined the broker in this sale of real property was the procuring cause of the sale and was therefore entitled to the agreed 4% commission:

“To prevail on a cause of action to recover a commission, the broker must establish (1) that it is duly licensed, (2) that it had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) that it was the procuring cause of the sale” … . Here, the issue disputed by the parties was whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale. “To establish that a broker was the procuring cause of a transaction, the broker must establish that there was ‘a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote'” between the bare introduction of the parties to the transaction and the consummation of the sale … . “[I]n order to qualify for a commission, a broker need not have been involved in the ensuing negotiations or in the completion of the sale,” if such a direct and proximate causal link exists … . …

It was Minetree’s [the broker’s] introduction of the subject properties to, and work with, TNC [the nature conservancy] which brought the County and the defendants together on a bargain sale transaction. Saunders Ventures, Inc. v Catcove Group, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 05879, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: If a broker is the “procuring cause” of the sale of real property, the broker is entitled to the commission agreed to in the broker’s contract.

 

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