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FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE SPECIFIC OR MAXIMUM PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION RENDERED THE GUILTY PLEA INVOLUNTARY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the plea was not voluntary because defendant was not informed of the specific or maximum period of postrelease supervision to which defendant would be sentenced:

“To meet due process requirements, a defendant must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action [and,] [w]ithout such procedures, vacatur of the plea is required” … . “It is not enough for a court to generally inform a defendant that a term of postrelease supervision will be imposed as a part of the sentence” … .. “Rather, for a plea of guilty to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court must inform the defendant of either the specific period of postrelease supervision that will be imposed or, at the least, the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed” … . People v Wolfe, 2022 NY Slip Op 04745, Second Dept 7-27-22

Practice Point: Failure to inform the defendant of the specific or maximum period of postrelease supervision aspect of the sentence rendered the guilty plea involuntary.

 

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