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GIVEN WHAT THE INFORMANT TOLD THE POLICE, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT GRABBED AT HIS WAISTBAND WHEN THE POLICE APPROACHED HIM ON THE STREET PROVIDED REASONABLE SUSPICION THE DEFENDANT HAD A WEAPON AND THEREBY JUSTIFIED PURSUIT; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE INFORMATION FROM THE INFORMANT WAS NOT ENOUGH BY ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE DEFDENDANT GRABBED AT HIS WAISTBAND BEFORE OR AFTER THE CHASE STARTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the police had “reasonable suspicion” to pursue defendant as he fled when the police approached on the street. The defendant discarded a handgun as he fled:

… [P]olice responded to a 911 call that a parolee wanted on an outstanding warrant and who was known to possess guns was a passenger in a certain vehicle. The officers found a vehicle matching the description given by the 911 caller and followed it, losing sight of the vehicle momentarily but then spotting it stopped on a curb with the passenger standing outside the vehicle. As one of the officers exited the police vehicle and began to approach the passenger, the passenger ran away while holding the left side of his waistband and the officer chased after him. …

The court properly determined that the officers had at least an objective, credible reason to approach defendant and request information … . Defendant’s subsequent flight with his hand on his waistband from the approaching officer, combined with the 911 caller’s report about a wanted violent parolee who was potentially armed, and the police officers’ observations confirming the vehicle and suspect descriptions from the 911 call, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant … .

From the dissent:

The People assert that the court properly determined that the pursuit was justified because, in addition to the information provided by the informant, the arresting officer observed defendant grabbing the front of his pants while running away, as if he had a gun in his waistband. Although defendant’s act of grabbing his waistband increased the degree of suspicion, perhaps even to the level required for pursuit, the evidence at the suppression hearing does not establish whether the arresting officer observed that conduct before or after he gave chase. People v Leonard, 2022 NY Slip Op 04468, Fourth Dept 7-8-22

Practice Point: Coupled with information provided from an informant claiming the defendant had guns and was violent, the defendant’s grabbing at his waistband as the police approached him on the street provided the police with reasonable suspicion the defendant had a weapon, thereby justifying police pursuit when defendant fled. The dissent argued the information from the informant did not provide reasonable suspicion and the People did not prove defendant grabbed at his waistband before he fled.

 

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