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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AUTHORIZED CHANGING THE CHILD’S NAME TO A NAME NOT REQUESTED IN FATHER’S PETITION, A HEARING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NAME CHANGE IS IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the court should not have authorized a change in the child’s name to a different name than that requested in father’s petition. The Fourth Department further found that a hearing to determine whether the name change is in the best interests of the child must be held:

The father filed the instant petition seeking to change the last name of the child to his surname and to alter the child’s first name because the father’s older daughter has the same name and lives with him and the child. The mother opposed the petition via sworn affidavit and provided a list of alternative names for the child to which she would not object. In its order, Supreme Court authorized the child to assume one of the names proposed by the mother, concluding that “the inclusion of both biological parents’ names in a child’s last name is reasonable and in the best interests of the child, particularly where, as here, both parents are active participants in the child’s life.” Thus, the court, in essence, denied the father’s petition in its entirety, and the father appeals.

… Civil Rights Law § 63 provides that, upon presentation of a petition for a name change, if the court “is satisfied . . . that the petition is true, and that there is no reasonable objection to the change of name proposed, . . . the court shall make an order authorizing the petitioner to assume the name proposed.” In the absence of a cross petition filed by the mother proposing a name change for the child, the only name that was properly before the court for consideration was the name change sought by the father in his petition.

Furthermore, “if the petition be to change the name of an infant, . . . the interests of the infant [must] be substantially promoted by the change”… . “With respect to the interests of the infant, the issue is not whether it is in the infant’s best interests to have the surname of the mother or father, but whether the interests of the infant will be promoted substantially by changing his [or her] surname” … . “As in any case involving the best interests standard, whether a child’s best interests will be substantially promoted by a proposed name change requires a court to consider the totality of the circumstances”  … . Matter of Segool v Fazio, 2018 NY Slip Op 08799, Fourth Dept 12-21-18

 

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