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A FIREFIGHTER INJURED ON THE JOB RETURNED TO THE JOB BUT COULD NOT WORK THE 10 TO 24 HOUR SHIFTS WHICH ARE THE “REGULAR DUTIES” OF A FIREFIGHTER; BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT OFFERED THE FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT OF THE SHORTER SHIFTS OR LIGHT-DUTY WORK, SHE WAS ENITLTED TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-A BENEFITS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner, a firefighter who had injured her shoulder on the job, was entitled to General Municipal Law 207-a benefits:

A firefighter seeking section 207-a benefits must show “that his or her injury or illness results from the performance of his or her duties and that he or she is physically unable to perform his or her regular duties as a firefighter … . The regular duties of a firefighter for the City required shifts of between 10-24 hours, and the medical evidence is undisputed that petitioner could work only 8-hour shifts. Inasmuch as the evidence established that petitioner could not work the longer shifts, and she was not offered the full-time equivalent of the shorter shifts or light-duty work, the determination that she is not entitled to General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits is arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Newman v City of Tonawanda, 2022 NY Slip Op 03834, Fourth Dept 6-9-22

Practice Point: Here petitioner-firefighter was injured on the job. When she returned to the job she could not work the 10 to 24 hour shifts which are the “regular duties’ of a firefighter. She was assigned shorter shifts which resulted in less pay. She was therefore entitled to General Municipal Law 207-a benefits.

 

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