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NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR ELECTRONICALLY, DURING A HOME VISIT BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined there was no reason mother’s attorney could not be present, either in person of electronically, during a home visit by the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS):

Where, as here, the Family Court issued an order temporarily releasing a child who is the subject of a neglect proceeding to a parent pending a final order of disposition (see Family Ct Act § 1027[d]), the order may include a direction for the parent to “cooperat[e] in making the child available for . . . visits by the child protective agency, including visits in the home” (id. § 1017[3]). However, there are no provisions of the Family Court Act—nor does ACS cite to any other authority—prohibiting a respondent in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 from having counsel present during a home visit. Thus, the respondent is not automatically prohibited from having an attorney—or any other individual—present in her home during the home visit, either in person or electronically. Matter of Lexis B. (Natalia B.), 2022 NY Slip Op 03721, Second Dept 6-8-22

​Practice Point: The Administration for Children’s Services (ASC) did not cite any authority for its attempt to preclude mother’s attorney from being present, either in person or electronically, during ASC’s home visits.

 

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