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Petitioner Entitled to Homestead Exemption During Period Prior to the Contract of Sale for Her Home

The Second Department determined that a January contract of sale of the petitioner’s home did not overcome the presumption in favor of recognizing the homestead exemption during the three months prior to the contract of sale.  The petitioner was in a nursing home and had indicated her “intent to return home” entitling her to the homestead exemption from the calculation of her assets during the pre-contract-of-sale period:

Pursuant to the Medicaid Reference Guide (hereinafter the MRG), published by the NYSDOH, when a Supplemental Security Income-related applicant is “requesting Medicaid coverage for the three month retroactive period . . . the value and availability of the applicant’s resources are determined as of the first day of the month for each month that applicant is seeking Medicaid coverage” (emphasis added). The MRG also provides that an applicant’s homestead, i.e., primary residence, is an exempt resource for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility despite the fact that the applicant is temporarily absent therefrom, if the applicant “indicates an intent to return” to the home. Pursuant to 18 NYCRR 360-4.7(a)(1), a person who is 65 or older loses the homestead exemption if he or she moves out of the home “without intent to return.” In determining such intent, “the proper standard to be applied is a subjective intent’ standard and not an objective expectations’ standard”… . There is a “presumption in favor of the homestead exemption” in cases where a hospitalized Medicaid applicant intends to return home … . Matter of Inglese v Shah, 2014 NY Slip Op 06586, 2nd Dept 10-1-14

 

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