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THE DIVORCE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT REQUIRED DEFENDANT TO PAY THE CHILDREN’S COLLEGE EXPENSES FOR FOUR YEARS AND DID NOT MENTION AN AGE CUT-OFF; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DETERMINED DEFENDANT’S OBLIGATION CEASED AT AGE 21 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the stipulation of settlement in the divorce stated that defendant would pay the children’s college expenses for four years with no mention of a cut-off at age 21. Supreme Court should not have ruled that the obligation ceased when the child turned 21:

… [T]he stipulation clearly and unambiguously required the defendant to pay 50% of the costs and expenses for each child’s college education for a total of four years, though his obligation to contribute to room and board expenses would be offset by any child support payments he made during that time. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, no age limitation or restriction was placed on his obligation to pay his share of these costs and expenses, and the stipulation cannot be fairly interpreted to provide that this obligation terminated upon the child’s emancipation … . Pape v Pape, 2022 NY Slip Op 03246, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: Here the divorce stipulation of settlement clearly stated defendant was obligated to pay the children’s college expenses for four years. Supreme Court should not have ruled the obligation ceased at age 21.

 

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