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PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON A PLASTIC SHEET PLACED OVER AN ESCALATOR TO PROTECT IT FROM DRIPPING PAINT; PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241 (6) ACTION DISMISSED; THE PLASTIC COVER WAS NOT A FOREIGN SUBSTANCE; AND THE PLASTIC COVER WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WORK; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined two provisions of the Industrial Code did not apply to this slip and fall on a plastic covering used to protect an escalator from dripping paint. The code provision requiring areas to be kept free of slippery “foreign substances” did not apply. And both code provisions were inapplicable because the condition was an integral part of the work being performed:

Sensibly interpreted, the heavy-duty plastic covering is not similar in nature to the foreign substances listed in the regulation, i.e., ice, snow, water or grease … . …

… [T]he covering was part of the staging conditions of the area plaintiff was tasked with painting, making it integral to his work. Therefore, even if the regulation arguably contemplates plastic sheeting to be a slipping hazard, under the factual circumstances here, the integral to the work defense bars plaintiff’s reliance on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d). …

… [T]he Supreme Court and the dissent incorrectly find liability pursuant to Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(e)(1). This section is inapplicable for the same reasons stated above with respect to Industrial Code Section 23-1.7 (d), namely that the plastic covering was an integral part of the work being performed … . Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 02189. First Dept 3-31-22

​Practice Point: Plaintiff slipped and fell on a plastic sheet placed to protect an escalator from dripping paint. The Labor Law 241(6) action was dismissed because (1) the plastic sheet was not a slippery foreign substance within the meaning of the Industrial Code and (2) the plastic sheet was an integral part of the work performed to which the Industrial Code does not apply.

 

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