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THE CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROBATION CONDITION WAS NOT INDIVIDUALLY TAILORED TO THE OFFENSE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED; IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE ERROR FOR APPEAL AND APPEAL WAS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was no justification for the “consent-to-search” probation condition. Defendant stole a cab driver’s cell phone and pled guilty to attempted assault. The court noted it was not necessary to preserve the error for appeal and appeal was not prohibited by the waiver of appeal:

The probation department [requested] that as a condition of probation, the defendant be required to consent to a search by a probation officer of his person, vehicle, and place of abode, and the seizure of any illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, gun/firearm or other weapon, or other contraband found (Condition No. 28). At sentencing, the Supreme Court imposed the consent to search condition of probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that this condition of his probation was improperly imposed.

The defendant correctly argues, and the People do not dispute, that this issue was not required to be preserved for appellate review, and that appellate review is not precluded by his waiver of the right to appeal … .

… [T]he defendant was a first-time offender and was not armed with a weapon at the time he committed the offense. While the defendant told the probation department that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offense, he was not assessed as being in need of alcohol or substance abuse treatment. Under the circumstances, the consent to search condition of probation was improperly imposed because it was not individually tailored in relation to the offense, and was not, therefore, reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation, or necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law abiding life … . People v Dranchuk, 2022 NY Slip Op 01312, Second Dept 3-2-22

 

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