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THE BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS DUPLICATIVE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION; THE APPEAL FROM AN ORDER WHICH WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A MOTION ON NOTICE MUST BE DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt which is too comprehensive and detailed to fairly summarize here. determined: (1) the cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action; and (2) an appeal from a supplemental order which was not the product of a motion on notice must be dismissed:

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “embraces a pledge that neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract” … , and is breached when a party acts in a manner that deprives the other party of the benefits of the contract (id.). Generally, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of the contract itself … . Therefore, a separate cause of action for breach of the covenant cannot be maintained where, as here, “it is premised on the same conduct that underlies the breach of contract cause of action and is intrinsically tied to the damages allegedly resulting from a breach of the contract” … . Because a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of the contract itself, plaintiffs may press their theory that defendants acted in derogation of the covenant in conjunction with their cause of action for breach of the license agreements … . We note that to the extent defendants were entitled to exercise discretion in the manner in which they performed their obligations … , they were, under the covenant (and, by natural extension, under the license agreement itself) prohibited from acting arbitrarily, irrationally, or in bad faith … . …

Defendants’ appeal from the supplemental order is dismissed because that order was not the product of a motion on notice (see CPLR 2214); rather, the supplemental order was issued in response to an inquiry from counsel seeking clarity regarding the court’s decision and order determining the summary judgment motions (see CPLR 5701[a][2] …). Parlux Fragrances, LLC v S. Carter Enters., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 01250, First Dept 2-24-22

 

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