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LESSOR OF THE VEHICLE INVOLVED IN THE REAR-END COLLISION WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE GRAVES AMENDMENT; SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO SEARCH THE RECORD AND GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVEN THOUGH NO MOTION HAD BEEN MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined Bancorp, the lessor of the vehicle leased by Fordham and driven by Fajerman, was entitled to summary judgment in this rear-end collision case pursuant to the Graves Amendment. The First Department noted Supreme Court had the authority to search the record and award summary judgment in the absence of a motion:

Bancorp’s request to search the record and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it under the Graves Amendment (49 USC § 30106) should have been granted. “On a motion for summary judgment, the court may search the record and, if warranted, grant summary relief even in the absence of a cross motion” … . “Under the Graves Amendment, the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held vicariously liable ‘for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if — (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)'” … . Here, the commercial lease agreement submitted by Bancorp, as well as the affidavit of Erika Caesar, Chief Diversity Officer of Assistant General Counsel for Bancorp, clearly establish that Bancorp, a commercial lessor of motor vehicles, had leased the vehicle that Fajerman was driving, to defendant Fordham. The commercial lease further establishes that Fordham was responsible for the maintenance and repairs for the vehicle during the period of the lease and during the time in which the accident occurred. Additionally, plaintiff did not allege any mechanical defects in the subject vehicle, and Fajerman also stated in her affidavit that the car did not have any mechanical defects. As such, Bancorp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the Graves Amendment … . Kalair v Fajerman, 2022 NY Slip Op 01244, First Dept 2-24-22

 

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