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THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE INTERVENTION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; STRONG TW0-JUSTICE DISSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, affirmed defendant’s murder conviction. The majority noted that some of the trial judge’s remarks would have been better left unsaid, but held the judge did not intervene excessively. The dissent disagreed:

… [W]hile many of the Supreme Court’s interventions were proper attempts to clarify testimony and facilitate the progress of the trial, we agree with our dissenting colleagues that other remarks would better have been left unsaid. Nevertheless, when the record is viewed as a whole, the court’s conduct, to the extent it was improper, did not prevent the jury from arriving at an impartial verdict on the merits … . * * *

From the dissent:

Viewing the record as a whole, the Supreme Court’s conduct, taken together with, inter alia, its disparate treatment of the two experts … , its efforts to point out inconsistencies in the testimony of the defendant’s wife … , and its assistance in eliciting testimony from the People’s witnesses … , “demonstrated apparent bias in favor of the People” … . This improper interference deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and thus, a new trial is warranted before a different Justice … . People v Martinez, 2022 NY Slip Op 00037, Second Dept 1-5-22

 

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