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PLAINTIFF-STUDENT ALLEGED INJURY IN AN AFTERSCHOOL PROGRAM RUN BY TWO TEACHERS; THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; THE PRINCIPAL’S APPROVAL OF THE AFTERSCHOOL PROGRAM WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NO SPECIAL DUTY WAS OWED PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the NYC Department of Education (DOE) was immune from suit by a student who alleged injury in an afterschool program run two teachers (Polanish and Gallagher) called “Mind, Body & Sport” (MBS). The school principal’s approval of the program was a discretionary act and no special duty was owned plaintiff:

The school principal’s granting of a permit for MBS to operate on school grounds was a discretionary action taken during the performance of a governmental function, and thus, the DOE was shielded from liability by the doctrine of governmental immunity … . Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the DOE owed the infant plaintiff a special duty that would render the DOE liable to plaintiffs for negligent acts … . Likewise, as to the MBS flyer, the DOE cannot be held liable through the doctrine of apparent authority for issuance of the flyer without the required disclaimer. As with the approval of the permit, the school principal’s approval of the MBS flyer involved the exercise of her reasoned judgment and discretionary authority, thus entitling DOE to governmental function immunity … .

The DOE also cannot be held liable for negligently supervising Polanish and Gallagher’s conduct during the MBS program. That the DOE permitted MBS to run as an afterschool program on school grounds does not provide a basis for holding the DOE liable, since “[a] defendant generally has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others, even where as a practical matter defendant can exercise such control” … . R.K. v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 07092, First Dept 12-21-21

 

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