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PLAINTIFF’S TITLE IX AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION, BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER IN 1972 AND 1973, ARE TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Title IX and 42 USC 183 causes action, based upon allegations plaintiff was sexually abused by a teacher in 1972 – 1973, were time barred:

“The federal civil rights statutes do not provide for a specific statute of limitations, establish rules regarding the tolling of the limitations period, or prescribe the effect of tolling” … . Thus, “courts entertaining claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [and Title IX] should borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions” … . Where a state “has one or more statutes of limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts, and a residual statute for all other personal injury actions[,] . . . the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies”… . Here, defendant correctly contends, and plaintiff does not dispute, that New York’s three-year statute of limitations for non-specified personal injury claims applies to the federal causes of action asserted here (see CPLR 214 [5] …).

… Plaintiff contends that CPLR 214-g, which revives certain civil claims and causes of action for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse that would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations, must be borrowed along with CPLR 214 (5) in determining whether her federal causes of action are timely. …

We … conclude that CPLR 214-g is not a revival statute related to the residual personal injury statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff’s section 1983 cause of action … . * * *

… [W]e conclude that plaintiff’s Title IX cause of action should also have been dismissed as time-barred. BL DOE 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 2021 NY Slip Op 06480, Fourth Dept 11-19-21

 

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