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PLAINTIFF HAD NO MEMORY OF EVENTS BEYOND WALKING TOWARD THE BUS AT A BUS STOP; SHE SUFFERED A CRUSHED FOOT; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the plaintiff’s verdict in this pedestrian-bus accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff had no memory of the incident beyond walking a couple of feet toward the bus at a bus stop. She suffered a crushed foot. But there was simply no evidence of negligence on the part of the bus driver:

“A motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a jury verdict and for judgment as [*2]a matter of law will be granted where there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusions reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” … . In determining such a motion, a court must accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented at trial … . However, “[a] jury verdict must be based on more than mere speculation or guesswork” …

Here, there was no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants on the issue of liability. Even if the circumstantial evidence sufficiently supported a conclusion that the plaintiff was injured due to an impact with a bus, the mere fact that the plaintiff was struck by a bus did not prove the defendants’ negligence … . In addition to establishing the fact of the accident, it was the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate what actually happened at the time of the accident so as to enable the jury to find that the defendants were negligent and that their negligence was a proximate cause of the accident … . Kirwan v New York City Tr. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 06350, Second Dept 11-17-21

 

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